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registry laws shall apply.4 This position is further supported by
the few decisions in point.5
Under the Chandler Act the procedure requiring recordation
by the trustee is clearly set out: Ten days after his qualification
the trustee must record, in each county where the bankrupt owns
real property, a certified copy of the order approving his bond."
Such document, when recorded, shall impart the same notice that
a deed or other instrument affecting property, if recorded, would
impart. 7
Where, as in the principal case, the trustee fails to record the
documents, as directed by the Act, and a loss occurs, an action
should lie against the trustee upon his official bond. Section 50
(b) 8 of the Act provides that this bond shall be conditioned on
the faithful performance of his official duties, one of which is to
record the order approving his bond, and that an action may be
brought on such bond by any person injuredY
W. J. B.
CHARITIES-TORT LIABILITY OF ELEEMOSYNARY INSTITUTIONS
TO REcIPIENTS OF THEIR SERVICES-An action was brought against
a charitable hospital for injuries sustained by a patient through
the negligence of the institution's agents. The defense was that a
charitable institution cannot be subjected to tort liability. Held,
such institutions are exempt from liability for injuries to bene-
ficiaries regardless of whether the employees negligently causing
such injuries were selected with due care. Wilcox v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. (2d) 849 (1938).
By the great weight of American authority, eleemosynary
4. Section 21(f) of the Chandler Act provides: "A certified copy of any
order or decree entered in a proceeding under this title . .. if recorded, shall
impart the same notice that a deed or other instrument affecting property,
if recorded, would impart." 52 Stat. 853, 11 U.S.C.A. 44(f) (Supp. 1939).
5. Beach v. Faust, 2 Cal. (2d) 290, 40 P. (2d) 822 (1935); Vombrack v.
Wavra, 331 Ill. 508, 163 N.E. 340 (1928). The court in the latter case said:
"Rules concerning a transfer of property are primarily a matter of state
regulation .... In the absence of specific or particular provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, the law of the state determines the efficiency of acts and
transactions to effect the transfer of the title to property, the time of the
passing of the title, and whether the recording or filing of an instrument is
required, and, if so, as to whom it will be void for the failure to record it."
(331 Ill. at 511, 163 N.E. at 342.) The court further pointed out that it was
manifest that the provisions of the act were designed to afford notice to third
persons and to provide protection to those relying upon the public records.
6. Chandler Act, § 47(c), 52 Stat. 861, 11 U.S.C.A. § 75(c) (Supp. 1939).
7. Chandler Act, § 21(f), 52 Stat. 853, 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(f) (Supp. 1939).
8. Chandler Act, § 50(b), 52 Stat. 863, 11 U.S.C.A. § 78 (Supp. 1939).
9. Chandler Act, § 50(n), 52 Stat. 864, 11 U.S.C.A. § 78 (Supp. 1939).
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institutions' are immune from tort liability to recipients of their
services;2 but there is a wide divergence of opinion as to the un-
derlying basis of this immunity.3 In this country, freedom from
tort liability was first based on the theory that the monies of a
charity are a trust fund which should not be depleted for pur-
poses other than those contemplated by the trust.4 Many courts
found that if this theory were extended to its logical conclusion,
too broad and too absolute an immunity would be granted.5 In
searching for a more restricted basis for immunity, the courts in
some jurisdictions applied principles of waiver, 6 and stated that
a person who accepts the benefits of a charity voluntarily enters
into a relationship which exempts his benefactor from liability.,
1. The purpose of a corporation and its manner of operating determine
its charitable character. See Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 87 P.
(2d) 374, 375 (Cal. App. 1939), and cases therein cited. Cf. Maretick v. South
Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488, 493, 17 N.E. (2d) 1012, 1015
(1938). But the fact that a corporation's income exceeds its operating ex-
penses does not make it any the less a charitable corporation If the excess
of income be used for carrying on the charitable purposes for which it was
organized. Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P. (2d) 807 (1939).
2. For a long list of some of the later authorities in support of the non-'
liability of charitable institutions for the negligence of their agents to a
beneficiary of its charity, see Andrew v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Des
Moines, 284 N.W. 186, 192 (Iowa 1939). See also Annotations in (1921) 14
A.L.R. 572 and (1937) 109 A.L.R. 1199. A wrong consisting of making false
and fraudulent representations comes within the rule that charitable insti-
tutions are not responsible for the torts of its agents. Boardman v. Bur-
lingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938).
But, for an early case holding charities responsible in tort, see Glarin
v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879). In accord:
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L.R.A. 1915D, 1167 (1915).
In Rhodes v. Millsaps College, 179 Miss. 596, 176 So. 253 (1937), the court held
that a charitable institution entering into an independent business apart
from its charity, even though to secure funds for its charitable purposes,
is liable in tort.
3. For an excellent discussion of the conflicts in the decisions on this
subject, see Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Des Moines, 284 N.W.
186 (Iowa 1939).
4. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am.
Rep. 529 (1876). In brief, the "trust fund" theory is as follows: all funds
donated to a charity are held in trust for a particular charitable purpose; it
is a breach of trust to apply them to any other purpose; the payment of
damages is not a purpose contemplated by the trust; and therefore, the trust
funds must not be diverted for such payment.
5. "Some of them ... fearful of a rule which practically placed charitable
institutions above and beyond the law with respect to non-liability for their
negligence, began to modify the rule.... If the trust fund doctrine Is sound,
an institution, engaged in public, charitable, eleemosynary, or religious work,
could not be held responsible in tort to any plaintiff ... ." Andrews v. Young
Men's Christian Ass'n of Des Moines, 284 N.W. 186, 189 (Iowa 1939).
6. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (C.C.A.
1st, 1901); Silva v. Providence Hospital, of Oakland, 87 P. (2d) 374 (Cal.
App. 1939).
7. Bardinelli v. Church of All Nations, 23 Cal. App. 713, 73 P. (2d) 1264
(1937); Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 87 P. (2d) 374 (Cal. App.
1939).
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Other courts have held charities free from liability for tortious
acts by refusing to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to
non-profit institutions.8 In the last analysis, however, the immun-
ity of charitable institutions, if defensible at all, must be grounded
on considerations of public policy. Judges have felt that persons
anxious to donate to these institutions should not be discouraged
by fear that the money intended for charity will be dissipated in
damage suits. Some courts, realizing the weaknesses of the other
theories, have openly based their decisions upon public policy
alone.10 But many have hesitated to deny recovery solely on
8. -earns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595, 31 L.R.A. 224
(1895). See also Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 633, 89 P. (2d) 807, 813 (1939).
In Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 424,
123 So. 466, 467 (1929), the court quoted with approval the following language
from' Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, supra: "On the whole, substantial justice
is best served by making a master responsible for the injuries caused by his
servant acting in his service, when set to work by him to prosecute his
private ends, with the expectation of deriving from that work private benefit.
This has at times proved a hard rule, but it rests upon a public policy too
firmly settled to be questioned. We are now asked to apply this rule, for
the first time, to a class of masters distinct from all others, and who do not
and cannot come within the reason of the rule. . . .We think the law does
not justify such an extension of the rule of respondeat superior."
But, in Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 396-
397, 175 N.W. 699, 700-701 (1920), the court stated: "Another reason urged is
that such corporations do not come within the main purpose of the rule of
public policy which supports the doctrine of respondeat superior because
they derive no gain from the service rendered. This contention does not seem
to us a just one. This corporation must administer its functions through
agents as any other corporation does. It harms and benefits third parties
exactly as they are harmed or benefitted by others. To the person injured
the loss is the same as though the injury had been sustained in a private
hospital for gain .... We do not approve the public policy, which would re-
quire the widow and children of deceased rather than the corporation, to
suffer the loss incurred through the fault of the corporation's employds, or
in other words, which would compel the persons damaged to contribute the
amount of their loss to the purposes of even the most worthy corporation."
9. "All of these theories have to a greater or less extent entered into the
formulation of the rule of law which has now become too well settled to be
questioned or overturned. Underlying all of them is the matter of public
policy, and it is upon this that the rule may be said finally to rest." Ettlinger
v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2d) 869, 872 (C.C.A. 4th, 1929).
10. Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2d) 869
(C.C.A. 4th, 1929); Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938);
Kolb v. Monmouth Memorial Hospital, 116 N.J.L. 118, 182 Atl. 822 (1936); Ver-
million v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916). Cf.
Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510, L.R.A. 1918C,
875 (1918).
In Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, supra, the court
used this language: "A policy of the law which prevents him who accepts
the benefit of a charity from suing it for the torts of its agents and servants,
and thus taking for his private use the funds which have been given for
the benefit of humanity, which shields gifts made to charity from 'the hungry
maw of litigation' and conserves them for purposes of the highest import-
ance to the state, carries on its face its own justification, and without the
aid of metaphysical reasoning, commends itself to the wisdom of mankind.
It is significant that almost without exception the courts, while giving dif-
ferent reasons for the rule, have not hesitated to apply it where the one
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grounds of public policy; and, by attempting to rest their con-
clusions on a doctrinal basis, have been faced with embarrassing
inconsistencies."1
It is submitted, however, that even the "public policy" theory
is an unsatisfactory basis for the granting of immunity. At the
present time, "the rule is unjust, anti-social and unsuited to mod-
em conditions, and . . . should be abandoned.' 12
The first case on this subject to arise in Louisiana was Jordan
v. Touro Infirmary."' The defendant hospital was sued for in-
juries resulting from a negligent act committed by a nurse while
performing duties in an operating room under a surgeon's or-
ders.14 The court pointed out that the nurse was not a servant of
the hospital at the time the negligent act was committed. It then
went further, and proceeded to state that, even if she were a
servant, a charitable agency is not liable in tort to recipients of
its services. 15 The dictum in the Jordan case has been accepted
and followed in subsequent decisions.16
The Louisiana cases are uniform in holding that the status
of the injured party as a paying patient is immaterial in deter-
mining liability; 7 the character of the charitable institution is
seeking to enforce liability against a charitable institution is one who has
accepted benefits from it."
11. See authorities cited in notes 2 and 3, supra.
12. Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities (1928) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 191.
13. 123 So. 726 (La. App. 1922).
14. No decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court dealing with the tort
liability of charities was found by this writer.
15. See Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726, 727-731 (La. App. 1922).
16. Foye v. St. Francis Sanitarium and Training School for Nurses, 2 La.
App. 305 (1925); Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11
La. App. 423, 123 So. 466 (1929). But see Rome v. London & Lancashire In-
demnity Co., 169 So. 132, 136 (La. App. 1936).
No Louisiana decision has extended the doctrine so as to grant immunity
to charitable corporations for torts causing injuries to persons who are not
the recipients of their services. See Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151
So. 797 (La. App. 1934). In accord: Unser v. Baptist Rescue Mission, 157 So.
298 (La. App. 1934). Nor has the rule been extended to protect insurance
companies which underwrite the liability of charitable institutions; they
cannot avail themselves of defenses provided for the purpose of keeping
eleemosynary agencies from being hindered in the discharge of their char-
itable functions. Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, 170 So. 801
(La. App. 1936). Cf. Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 127 S.W. (2d) 284
(Tenn. App. 1938).
17. Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App. 1922); Foye v. St.
Francis Sanitarium and Training School for Nurses, 2 La. App. 305 (1925);
Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 123
So. 466 (1929); Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 (La. App. 1934).
In accord: Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 AtI. 761 (1938); Miller
v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P. (2d) 807 (1939). But see England v. Hospital
of the Good Samaritan, 70 P. (2d) 692, 693 (Cal. App. 1937). Cf. Robertson
v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S.E. 432
(1937).
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not affected by the imposition of a charge upon those able to
pay.
From the Louisiana jurisprudence, it is apparent that, re-
gardless of the precise ground of immunity, 8 a charity is not
liable for the torts of qualified servants. There is no Louisiana
decision dealing with the liability of a charitable institution for
the negligence of its managers in selecting incompetent sub-
ordinate agents. In a number of cases there are sporadic state-
ments to the effect that a charitable hospital is not liable for the
torts of servants selected with due care.'9 The significance of such
statements is not clear. One might infer that liability will be
imposed. where there is a lack of due care in the selection of
servants.20 On the other hand, it might be contended that such
statements were merely precautionary and bounded the issue
presented by the particular facts under consideration. 2'
F. H. O'N.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE--SECURITY CLAUSE AS A POTESTATIVE CON-
DITION-The vendee of an automobile executed notes secured by
a chattel mortgage which the vendor transferred to the plaintiff.
Acting under a clause of the mortgage which gave the mortgagee
the right to declare the notes immediately due and payable if he
deemed himself insecure, the plaintiff obtained an order of ex-
ecutory process against the vendee. Held, the clause in question
is null as a potestative condition under Articles 2024 and 2034 of
the Civil Code. Motors Securities Co., Inc. v. Tullos, 178 So. 634
(La. App. 1938).
18. All of the various theories of immunity are discussed in the Louisiana
cases; from the cases as a whole it is not clear upon which theory Louisiana
courts base their decisions.
19. See Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726, 730-731 (La. App. 1922);
Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 428,
123 So. 466, 470 (1929).
20. In the following cases, where the servants were not selected with
due care, the charity was held liable: St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson,
178 Tex. Civ. App. 108, 164 S.W. 36 (1914); Roberts v. Ohio Valley General
Hospital, 198 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925). Cf. Lindler v. Columbia Hospital
of Richland County, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914). See also Rhodes v. Millsaps
College, 179 Miss. 596, 618-620, 176 So. 253, 255 (1937).
21. As was said by the Massachusetts court of a similar statement in
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 70, 126 N.E. 392, 394
(1920): "It simply showed the extent of the decision. It does not purport to
be a comprehensive or exclusive statement. The correlative assertion, to the
effect that there is liability of the hospital in cases where there has been
carelessness on the part of the managers In the selection of servants and
agents, is neither expressed nor implied." For cases holding charitable agen-
cies Immune from liability for negligence in the selection of agents, see
Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2d) 869 (C.C.A. 4th,
